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Recent trends in psychology have revealed increasing discontent toward representational explanations of
behavior. However, whether these trends have the conceptual resources to address the full range of
cognitive phenomena remains unclear. Here, I defend neorealism (Holt, 1914) as the missing philosoph-
ical link between radically embodied cognitive science and a more encompassing psychology. Neore-
alism identifies cognitive contents, however subjective or unreal in appearance, with portions or cross
sections of the objective environment. These portions are extended in time and they sustain causal and
historical relations to current behavior. I sketch how neorealist concepts can help psychologists to address
phenomena such as dreams and imagery in fully environmental terms.
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Eu não canto o fado, o fado é que me canta.
—Amália Rodrigues (1920–1999)
Psychology was born in disunity and remains in disarray. From
its historical roots in 19th-century psychophysics, psychopathol-
ogy, mental testing, social science, and biology, psychology has
always reflected various conflicting orientations (Koch, 1993).
Conflicts have ranged from empirical to methodological to philo-
sophical (Goertzen, 2008). The few strategies that have been
proposed toward unification have met with little success and
remain as fragmented as the discipline itself (Yanchar & Slife,
1997). This state of affairs is hardly surprising because it reflects
fundamental disagreements on several philosophical options.
A first disagreement, or fundamental choice point, concerns the
scientific nature of psychology. Should psychology be a natural
science? Researchers with a cognitive, behavioral, or biological
orientation answer in the affirmative whereas proponents of hu-
manistic or hermeneutic approaches argue that psychology as a
natural science is incomplete at best (Koch, 1981). Those who
defend the project of a scientific psychology do so, presumably,
because they think that the project is worth trying—that the po-
tential good of psychology as a natural science will prevail over
any possible harm. Their choice cannot be shown to be correct a
priori, but it may eventually be justified by its fruits. So far,
although the successes cannot be denied, they seem small in
relation to remaining needs and to the amount of effort that has
been invested in developing psychological science.
Disagreements also abound within the natural science approach
to psychology. Some concern the subject matter of psychological
studies (Brunswik, 1952). Should psychology address experience,
behavior, the internal mechanisms that make the latter possible, or
any and all of the above? Again, the issues are primarily philo-
sophical and involve different ontological interpretations of psy-
chological phenomena (Smith, 1988). For example, does the mind
consist in behavior or in something else (Rachlin, 2012)? Although
scientific psychologists differ widely in terms of their ontological
views and proposed subject matter, one methodological principle
has commanded broad agreement: Psychological explanations are
to be evaluated by examining behavior. This methodological be-
haviorism (a result, in part, of Watson’s, 1913 manifesto) is no
guarantee against triviality of results, but it constitutes a common
ground for comparing different theories as well as different theo-
retical approaches.
In this respect, it is important to note that the role of scientific
paradigms and their incommensurability, as well as the alleged
theory-ladenness of data, have been overrated by psychologists. In
psychology as well as elsewhere, differences among paradigms do
not have any radical implication for theory testing (Sankey, 1997),
and data do test theories in an independent fashion (Franklin et al.,
1989). Thus, as long as they are empirically grounded, and regard-
less of who raises them, objections to one’s theoretical outlook
must be taken seriously. They cannot be dismissed as a symptom
of paradigm incommensurability and then set aside. Rather, they
signal the need to adapt one’s explanations, and in some cases, to
modify one’s conceptual resources so as to accommodate empir-
ical inadequacies.
The Need for Neorealism
In recent years, several researchers have been increasingly crit-
ical of representational explanations of behavior and of the repre-
sentational theory of mind. Under the labels of embodied, enactive,
or extended cognition (e.g., Chemero, this issue; Di Paolo, this
issue; Hutto, this issue), these researchers emphasize the richness
of animals’ (and people’s) ecological environment and how it
provides guidance to action. Their explanations of cognitive per-
formance typically appeal to the mutual dynamics of environment
and behavior in the form of ongoing feedback loops (Nielsen,
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2010). In all cases, these approaches take an organism’s environ-
ment as constitutive, at least in part, of cognition, and they stress
the importance of identifying the features of the organism’s sur-
roundings that are actually related to behavior (Turvey & Carello,
1981).
An obvious problem for these research programs is to account
for the sort of cognition that occurs without any apparent input or
any feedback loop that could guide current behavior (Grush,
2002). Mental imagery, problem solving “in one’s head,” and
language production are common examples of the phenomena that
motivated representational accounts in the first place. Failing to
account for them would invalidate a general account of the mind in
terms of direct perception (e.g., Chemero, 2009) and severely
restrict the scope of ecological, nonrepresentational psychology.
Here, I will argue that the conceptual resources of ecological
and direct perception approaches can be extended so as to explain
mental images, dreams, and more generally the cognitive phenom-
ena that seem to take place in the absence of any environmental
input. The needed conceptual extension is the philosophical frame-
work of neorealism or new realism, pioneered by Edwin B. Holt
and his colleagues in the early 20th century (Holt et al., 1910,
1912). Neorealism was quickly overshadowed by behaviorism, but
a modernized version can address adequately the very problems
that plague nonrepresentational approaches to cognition (Tonneau,
2011a).
I will proceed at a framework level by developing a set of
neorealist theoretical concepts that extend direct cognition in more
inclusive directions. I have no new data to discuss. Instead, my
strategy will be to show that the data commonly taken to support
representationalism can in fact be explained in strictly environ-
mental terms. I will conclude with some brief methodological
recommendations that are neither required by neorealism nor spe-
cific to it, but they are, I think, needed to move psychology
forward.
The Organism and the Cross Section
Neorealism is a kind of radical environmentalism in the sense of
Chemero and Silberstein (2008). The basic philosophical thesis of
neorealism is that the contents of cognition (in particular, the
contents present in thought and consciousness) are parts of the
environment that fulfill specific functions with respect to behavior.
In particular, consciousness is an external relation between the
knower and the known “and does not denote a special stuff or way
of being” (James, 1904, p. 486).
An implication of this thesis at the level of scientific research is
that psychologists should analyze the environment so as to dis-
cover which functions it fulfills and in which conditions. Living
organisms never interact with the totality of the word at one time
but with different parts of the world at different times. The part of
the world with which an animal is interacting at any given time is
called a cross section of the environment (Holt, 1914).
Now there are obvious physical and geographical restrictions on
which parts of the environment, or cross sections, can influence an
organism’s behavior at any given time. In many cases, the possi-
bility of an object X affecting behavior depends on a medium of
contact, such as ambient light (Gibson, 1979; Kantor, 1921). In
other cases, an appropriate medium of contact is present, but X
fails to affect behavior unless other conditions (say, of a motiva-
tional type) are fulfilled. For instance, right now I do not tell
anyone what is in front of me, but I would if somebody asked me.
In these cases, let us say that X is behaviorally available: A part X
of the environment that is currently available does not necessarily
affect behavior, but it would do so under additional conditions.
(Hence, the concept of availability is dispositional. However,
availability is a disposition of the environment with respect to an
organism, not a disposition of the organism with respect to the
environment.)
The behavioral availability of some part X of the environment
depends on the existence of a response mechanism that is sensitive
to X (Holt, 1914). For example, in animals with a central nervous
system, this response mechanism includes the brain and other parts
of the animal’s body. An important idea of neorealism is that an
animal’s response mechanism is never decoupled from what it is
responding to (or what is available behaviorally). Comparatively
speaking, animals with simple response systems are able to re-
spond to simple cross sections of the environment whereas animals
with complex response systems are able to respond to complex
cross sections of the environment.
In particular, animals in which the functioning of an integrated
response system depends on complex quantitative relations among
the activities of its response components will respond to properties
of the environment that bear equally complex relations to basic
physical properties (cf. Turvey, Shaw, Reed, & Mace, 1981). For
example, in some circumstances, people asked to judge the
“length” of a hand-held rod may react not to the length of the rod
but to its moment of inertia around the wielding axis, a function of
distance and mass (Turvey, Solomon, & Burton, 1989). More
generally, people asked to judge the magnitude of some physical
variable x may react instead to a combination of n physical
variables x1, x2, . . ., xn, a combination that seems arbitrary from
the perspective of fundamental physical theory, but it is neverthe-
less perfectly real and objective. Thus, according to neorealism,
psychophysical scales do not describe relations between objective
physical properties and subjective (or internal) psychological vari-
ables. Rather, these scales describe mathematical relations be-
tween two kinds of equally objective environmental properties: the
simple properties that a physicist might measure (and to which the
organism usually does not react) and the complex properties to
which the organism does react.
Another important application of the neorealist idea of coupling
concerns changes in the state of a single response mechanism over
time (as opposed to variations in the response mechanisms of a
population of animals). To become behaviorally available, a part X
of the environment must affect the animal’s response mechanism.
That is, X must cause the response mechanism to move from one
state to another. However, because causation in biology is typi-
cally baseline dependent, a causal relation between X and a change
in the response mechanism may be possible only when the latter is
in a specific baseline state (Tonneau, 2004). For example, an
object A might only cause a change in the response mechanism
when the latter is in state M1, whereas another object B might only
do so when the response mechanism is in another state M2. For
example, a glass of water (object A) might only affect my behavior
when I am dehydrated (state M1) whereas a blanket (object B)
might only affect my behavior when I am cold (state M2).
Now imagine that A and B are present in the environment, that
the initial state of the animal’s response mechanism is M1, and that
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A causes the response mechanism to move from state M1 to state
M2 (see Figure 1). The mere fact that the animal’s response
mechanism leaves M1 for M2 will automatically disable any causal
relation from A while simultaneously enabling B to move the
response mechanism from state M2 to yet another state M3. Figure
1 shows what happens when three different parts of the environ-
ment (A, B, and C) require states M1, M2 and M3, respectively, to
act on the response mechanism and therefore become behaviorally
available. As the response mechanism moves from one state to
another, the cross section that is behaviorally available moves from
one part of the environment to another (Tonneau, 2004).
The coupling process illustrated in Figure 1 is simplicity itself.
You can get an intuitive idea of how it works by placing two
different objects in front of your eyes and then closing one eye and
opening the other in alternation; as you do so, the part of the
environment of which you are aware alternates from one object to
the other. However, the neorealist concept of coupling (Holt, 1914)
is surprisingly easy to misunderstand. Notice first that although the
cross section and the response mechanism evolve in a parallel
fashion (see Figure 1), their evolutions are entirely different mat-
ters. Whereas the response mechanism evolves by moving from
one state to another, the corresponding cross section evolves by
moving from one thing (or part of the environment) to another, and
these things themselves do not change, at least not as a result of
this process. Thus, changes in the content of a cross section are
more like changing one’s clothes than like changing one’s facial
expression. When you change clothes, it is your relation to two
different pieces of clothing that changes (Tonneau, 2004). The
clothes themselves do not change.
Second, the coupling shown in Figure 1 is an automatic conse-
quence of the fact that the causal relations that the organism
sustains to different parts of the environment are enabled and
disabled one after the other (Tonneau, 2004). The neorealist pro-
cess of coupling does not depend on any feedback loop between
the environment and the organism. Such feedback loops undoubt-
edly occur at many levels of analysis, and they are undoubtedly
important, but they are not necessary to the parallel evolution of a
cross section and the associated response mechanism (see Figure
1).
Finally, Holt’s concept of coupling is fully compatible with the
realist thesis that cognitive contents are ontologically independent
of the organism’s response mechanism (Holt et al., 1912). To
clarify, and using a distinction first proposed by Montague (1912),
whereas there is a dependency between the response mechanism
and “which object” the organism is responding to, there is no
dependency between the response mechanism and “the object”
itself. The first kind of dependency is a result of coupling and
indisputably obtains in Figure 1. At any moment, the state of the
response mechanism (M1, M2, or M3) determines which object (A,
B, or C) is behaviorally available. However, the second kind of
dependency, which would imply that the object available at a given
time depends on the state of the response mechanism, does not
follow from coupling and does not obtain in Figure 1. At any
moment (say, t1), the object that is behaviorally available (say, A)
is completely independent of the response mechanism and would
exist even if the latter did not.
Figure 1 is analogous to looking at different objects in succes-
sion. As you look at each object in turn, which thing you look at
depends on the position of your eyes. At the same time, the thing
you look at does not depend on the position of your eyes and
would exist even if you were blind. In other words, according to
neorealism, a response mechanism is always selective, not creative
(Holt, 1914). Cognition consists in a bodily mechanism’s respond-
ing to a (in-principle specifiable) portion of the objective and
independently existing world. This portion of the word, or cross
section, is the organism’s cognitive content (Holt, 1914; James,
1904).
Spreading Cross Sections in Time
The neorealist explanation of cognition in terms of a cross
section that shifts its content over time requires these successive
contents (such as A, B, C in Figure 1) to be actually present in the
environment. However, in the case of dreams, mental imagery, or
more generally “silent thinking,” nothing seems to fit the bill. If I
dream of my grandmother or imagine a blue elephant, what por-
tions of the environment could be identical with my thoughts?
Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, neorealism main-
tains that such portions can be found—not in the environment
defined over an arbitrarily short time scale, admittedly—but in an
objective environment that is as extended in time as the person’s
own response mechanism (Tonneau, 2011a). In cases of veridical
memory, neorealism identifies a person’s remembrance of a past
event A with A itself (or some part of it). The event A becomes
behaviorally available not at the moment it occurs (say, t), but at
some later time t x. There is nothing surprising or illogical about
this because delays between environmental events and our re-
sponse to them are ubiquitous. Even the simplest unconditional
reflex or stimulus-response relation has a nonzero latency, which
implies that stimuli and responses are always separated in time.
Whether we are dealing with a simple reflex or a complex memory
phenomenon, the organism’s response to some environmental
event A occurs after some delay x. Of course, in all cases, the
delayed reaction is made possible by the existence of an internal
A B C A B C A B C 
M2 M3 M 1 
Time 
t 1 t 2 t 3 
Figure 1. Changes in the content of a cross section. Time flows from left
to right. M1, M2, and M3 are three successive states of the organism’s
response mechanism (taken at instants t1, t2, and t3, respectively). As the
response mechanism moves from one state to another, different portions of
the environment (A, B, and C, in this order) become available for behav-
ioral guidance. Notice that the organism, indicated by a shaded rectangle,
is extended in time. Adapted from “Consciousness outside the head,” by F.
Tonneau, F., 2004, Behavior and Philosophy, 32, pp. 97–123, Figure 5.
Copyright ●●● by ●●●. Adapted with permission.
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response mechanism that is itself extended in time, with a duration
equal to x. Whether the situation is classified as “perception” or
“memory” depends on the length of x and is otherwise completely
arbitrary (Gibson, 1979; White, 1985).
The neorealist concept of direct memory (as opposed to indirect,
or representational memory) is important not only for experimental
psychology but (also) in the context of clinical applications (Ton-
neau, 2011b). For example, in posttraumatic stress disorder, ac-
cording to neorealism the person is not reacting to an internal
representation of the traumatic event but to the event itself. Her
body is extended in time, her eyes are extended in time, and her
response mechanism is extended in time (Tonneau, 2011a). It is no
objection that there is a delay between the original event and the
person’s current response. As we have seen, there is always a
delay, even in the simplest reflex—and reflexes can be far from
simple.
In the case of hallucinations and dreams, neorealism assumes
that the person reacts to environmental patterns that are not only
remote in time from the current response (as stimuli always are)
but (also) involve temporal and spatial disconnections among their
components. Draw two figures side by side on a sheet of paper: a
red triangle on the left and a blue square on the right. Each of the
two figures can be seen as a combination of color and shape: {red,
triangle}and {blue, square}. However, the two figures do not
exhaust the combinations of colors and shapes present on the sheet
of paper. For example, the {red, square} and {blue, triangle}
combinations are just as real as the two figures although these pairs
are made of disconnected components. The main difference be-
tween the {red, triangle} and {blue, square} pairs, on the one hand,
and the {red, square} and {blue, triangle} pairs, on the other hand,
is not in their degree of reality but in their degree of spatial
connectedness.
Turning to the time domain, neorealism assumes that living
organisms can react to temporally disconnected combinations of
features present in their environment (Tonneau, 2004). These
combinations are what people react to in the phenomenon of
illusory conjunctions (e.g., Treisman, 1998). (Notice how perfectly
real combinations of features are dubbed “illusory” just because
they span wider temporal intervals than “real conjunctions.”) Ac-
cording to neorealism, the person who falls prey to a hallucination
is not reacting to unreal aspects of the environment. Rather, the
person is reacting to (a) real combinations of components sepa-
rated by wide temporal gaps while (b) failing to react to these
temporal gaps (Tonneau, 2011a).
Figure 2 illustrates how reacting to temporally disconnected
features of the environment can emulate a process of variable
binding (cf. Minsky, 1975). The top line of the figure shows a
simple situation with an object A on top of another object B.
Therefore, A and B occupy two positions that bear the spatial
relation, on-top-of, to each other (vertical, dashed arrow in Figure
2). The second line of Figure 2 shows the structure of a visual
hallucination in which two features, A and B, are separated in time
from each other and from the later occurrence of the on-top-of
relation. In this case, the person reacts to (a) the disconnected pair,
{A, above}; (b) the disconnected pair, {B, below}; and (c) the
on-top-of relation between the top and bottom positions. The
victim of this hallucination would presumably describe it as “A
being above B.” The third line of Figure 2 shows the structure of
the visual hallucination that one would describe as “B being above
A.”
Replacing the spatial relation of Figure 1 (on-top-of) by a
temporal relation (e.g., before or after) gives the building block of
illusory movements, dynamic hallucinations, trains of thought, and
dreams. In all cases, the environmental structures to which the
person reacts are perfectly real and objective (Nunn, 1909–1910).
What they lack is not reality, but temporal contiguity. In several
well-known cases, standard conditions allow disconnected envi-
ronmental structures to act on anyone with a high probability.
These are called “illusions,” and although that label seems to imply
a response to something nonreal, they can be more simply under-
stood as oddly featured cross sections of the environment. They
span time gaps that are typically no longer than a few seconds.
However, When disconnected environmental structures start to
involve longer time gaps such as days or years, the conditions
under which they act (depending, as they do, on a person’s exten-
sive history of interactions with the environment) become increas-
ingly difficult to predict. They become increasingly unavailable to
third parties and are deemed irremediably “subjective” or “unreal,”
as in the case of dreams and hallucinations. Phosphenes also fall in
this category (Manzotti, 2006).
However, in all cases, neorealism maintains that the part of the
world being responded to can be discovered empirically. When
dealing with shorter time scales, illusory contents can be produced
by presenting stimuli in succession and controlling their nature and
Time A
B
Above 
Below 
A B
Above 
Below 
A B
Above 
Below 
Figure 2. Relational structures in the temporally extended environment.
A and B are two distinct objects or sets of features. The vertical, dashed
arrow indicates the spatial relation, on-top-of, holding between two posi-
tions (one above the other). Dotted arcs relate the components of the pairs
to which a person reacts. In the top line, the relational structure to which
the person reacts is temporally connected. In the two bottom lines, some
components of the structure are separated by time intervals that could range
from seconds to years.
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time of occurrence. The resulting illusory contents can then be
related to stimulus characteristics and to the subjects’ sensitivity to
hallucination (e.g., Randell, Goyal, Saunders, & Reed, 2011). For
example, over a medium-scale time, experimental research is still
possible by correlating features of the environment with one an-
other and recording changes in the content of the resulting cross
section (Haijiang, Saunders, Stone, & Backus, 2006). Consistent
with a neorealist view of Pavlovian conditioning (see Tonneau,
2011a, for more details), experimental research on the condition-
ing of perception shows that these two phenomena are really two
sides of the same coin. Finally, over large time scales, experimen-
tal research becomes practically impossible, and it is necessary to
turn to ethnographic, biographical, and clinical research (cf. Ben-
tall, 1990) to uncover the conscious contents that reside in a
person’s entire life history.
From a neorealist perspective, the ultimate roots of subjectivity
are history and context. A person can have subjectivity only to the
extent that the associated cross sections are unique to her; systems
without history do not have subjectivity. The disconnected struc-
tures sketched in Figure 2 are theoretically important for another
reason. The different arrangements shown on the second and third
line of the figure illustrate how an environment that is extended in
time encompasses enough resources for systematicity and compo-
sitionality (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). The ability for the system-
atic combination of available units, although often discussed in
relation to language, is already evident in the perception of envi-
ronmental structure (Hummel, 2000). Understanding the structure
of the environment is a prerequisite for understanding the structure
of behavior, including language.
Conclusion
Developing a more successful version of psychology will re-
quire a synergy of philosophical background, theoretical concepts,
and empirical methods that cohere with one another and are at least
approximately correct as a starting point (Boyd, 1981). As a
philosophy of mind, neorealism implies that psychological phe-
nomena are constituted by the environment as it relates to behavior
(Holt, 1915). Because psychological phenomena are never located
in the brain, neural reductionism is rejected. Instead, neorealism
emphasizes causal and historical explanations in terms of an or-
ganism’s interacting with its environment.
The central concept of cross section (Holt, 1914) allows for the
identification of basic psychological units that are open to modi-
fication. For example, development is seen as the modification of
cross sections (and their relations to behavior) during ontogeny.
Motivation and emotion refer to the behavioral availability of
historical relations between the environment (including parts of the
body) and previous responses. In social animals, the cross sections
available to guide behavior may include cultural aspects. Neore-
alism rejects holism because everything is not equally connected to
everything else. Neorealism focuses instead on determining the
specific parts of the environment (past and present) most affecting
behavior and studying how these relations become incorporated in
more complex units during development (Goldfield, 1983).
Neorealism is open with respect to methods. Experimentation,
although obviously needed, is not and should not be the only
source of psychological knowledge. Observational studies are at
least as important. In fact, they are more important than experi-
mentation when the time scales of the phenomena involved make
experimental control practically impossible. However, no progress
will be made in psychology unless its standards of data analysis
greatly improve. Especially in recent times, psychology has seen
inferential statistics applied mindlessly on group data and poor
measurements to the detriment of scientific understanding (Wang,
1993). With or without neorealism, progress in psychology ur-
gently needs more detailed analyses of the interactions of individ-
uals with their environment.
Neorealism can be summarized in one motto: taking the envi-
ronment seriously. Even the approaches that grant the environment
a fundamental role as a constituent of mental states have done so
in a restricted fashion: most notably by limiting their quest of
environmental constituents to those that are temporally connected.
However, several lines of research, from radically embodied cog-
nitive science to behavior analysis (Tonneau, 2011a), now call for
theoretical integration as well as an expansion of environmental
explanations beyond their traditional, self-imposed limits. By
moving beyond temporal connectedness, neorealism integrates
these different research programs and significantly increases the
scope of radically embodied cognitive science.
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